Electronic Procurement of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices in Chile: An Initial Empirical Investigation by Raventos, Pedro & Zolezzi, Sandro
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 2009 Proceedings International Conference on Information Systems(ICIS)
2009
Electronic Procurement of Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Devices in Chile: An Initial Empirical
Investigation
Pedro Raventos
INCAE Business School, pedro.raventos@incae.edu
Sandro Zolezzi
CINDE, szolezzi@cinde.org
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2009
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 2009 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Raventos, Pedro and Zolezzi, Sandro, "Electronic Procurement of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices in Chile: An Initial Empirical
Investigation" (2009). ICIS 2009 Proceedings. 39.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2009/39
 Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix, Arizona 2009 1 
ELECTRONIC PROCUREMENT OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
AND MEDICAL DEVICES IN CHILE: AN INITIAL 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 




INCAE Business School 
Apartado Postal 960-4050, 








Plaza Roble, Escazú, 




The return on investments in electronic procurement platforms has been elusive. We show that the 
use of an electronic platform for the procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical devices has 
saved the Government of Chile money. Using a unique data set that covers purchases of the same 
items before and after the new Chilecompra platform was introduced in 2004 and includes 
controls for other variables that may have affected prices, we find that Chilecompra saved the 
government over 8% and that greater aggregation of purchases saved a further 3%. Consistent 
results are found when government prices are compared with those of Chile’s three drugstore 
chains. Chilecompra has resulted in quantifiable economic benefits which are related to volume 
and platfom effects rather than a greater number of competitors. These results help fill a gap in 
the literature on the returns to Information Technology investment, and are consistent with work 
in Health Economics. 
Keywords: Electronic markets, aggregation, tendering, pharmaceuticals, Chile 
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Introduction 
During the 1990s it was expected that new technologies, facilitated by the Internet, would transform commercial 
relations and have a profound effect on productivity. Electronic procurement by corporations promised to save 
resources, accelerate cycle times and reduce errors. If purchases were aggregated, both within the organization and 
with other buyers, and if new tendering techniques were used, lower prices could be achieved.  
As the enthusiasm of the financial markets faded at the turn of the millennium, vendors increasingly turned their 
attention to governments, espousing the same benefits in terms of lower transaction costs and prices. It was argued 
that governments would achieve these advantages more readily as they did not face the “chicken and egg” problem 
encountered by corporations. As the largest buyer in the economy, the government could force suppliers to join its 
marketplace, and it did not have to coordinate with other buyers to achieve buying power. 
Adoption of government procurement platforms was encouraged by two additional factors. First, it allowed 
politicians to counter accusations of lack of transparency in the spending of public funds. Second, multilateral 
institutions, like the World Bank, supported these initiatives, both financially and by leveraging their considerable 
experience in contracting. 
Several years later, however, there is little empirical evidence that these platforms have delivered. A recent survey, 
The Economist (2008), finds that the results of eGovernment have been disappointing. Services to citizens, such as 
obtaining a passport or booking an appointment with a doctor, have not lived up to expectations, despite large 
investments.  Interestingly, the survey hardly discusses government electronic procurement. We believe this is 
because there is no solid evidence in either direction. 
The absence of a spending “baseline” is often blamed for this. If purchase prices for different goods and services 
were available for a period before the introduction of the platform –the so called “baseline period”-, saving achieved 
with the platform could be calculated by comparing those prices to the prices obtained after the platform was 
implemented.  For this reason the World Bank (2004) recommended that governments define a baseline before 
implementing e-procurement initiatives.  
In most actual cases, however, there is no baseline because the government was not able to capture data in a usable 
way before the reform. The inability to visualize spending in an analytical way is one of the reasons for introducing 
an electronic platform in the first place. Moreover, even if baseline data were available, simple “before v. after 
comparisons” would only be valid if other conditions had remained constant1. 
This paper overcomes these difficulties. We use a database of government purchases of pharmaceuticals (henceforth 
drugs) and medical devices in Chile between 2001 and 2006, which spans 2004, the year in which use of 
Chilecompra, the government procurement platform, was made obligatory for public agencies. This data was 
available for the health sector in a way that was usable, because in the 1970s the Chilean government created 
Cenabast to help public hospitals purchase and manage inventories.  We also have extensive data for other variables 
that should affect prices. Our model shows that Chilecompra has saved the government 8.3% in drug purchases and 
9.1% in medical devices.  
We are also able to confirm two hypotheses that have been of great interest in health economics. First, that there are 
discounts for volume for drugs and medical devices, a result that Ellison and Snyder (2001) were not able to 
corroborate for lack of data, and which has been found for hospital services by Wu (2009). Second, the greater a 
buyer’s substitution possibilities the lower the price it pays. This confirms results of Ellison and Snyder (2001), 
Sorensen (2003) and Wu (2009).  
According to conventional wisdom, procurement platforms attract a larger number of bidders, and this leads to 
lower prices. Although we confirm that a greater number of bidders lead to lower prices, the number of bidders for 
drugs did not change whereas for medical devices it actually fell after the introduction of Chilecompra.   
Our work fills a gap in the literature on the returns to IT investments.  Over twenty years ago, Solow (1987) 
indicated that computers were found everywhere but in the productivity statistics. Work over the last ten years has 
resolved this paradox. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996) first identified the productivity of computer investments and IS 
                                                          
1 The same applies for corporate procurement platforms. 
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labor by estimating production functions with firm level data. Dedrick et al. (2003) is a good survey of the early 
literature. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and more recently Jorgenson et al. (2007) were able to do the same using 
industry data. Arial et al. (2006) has taken the firm level research a step further by finding the impact of ERP 
systems on a series of operational metrics.  By distinguishing purchase time from “go live” they were able to avoid 
the simultaneity problem. They were also able to find the added effect of SCM and CRM solutions on these metrics.  
Procurement initiatives can have an impact even more directly, by reducing the prices paid for inputs. Bichler et al. 
(2006) reports an average saving of 13%, based on the information obtained from a sample of software vendors. 
Pinker et al. (2003) complained that academic research on this topic had been made difficult by lack of data, and this 
has not changed much.  Recent work has explored characteristics that are associated with greater price reduction in 
reverse auctions. Mithas and Jones (2007) show that a rank bidding format leads to greater buyer surplus when there 
are incumbent suppliers. Millet et al. (2004) suggests that the number of bids is more important that the number of 
bidders that are invited.  
Although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence, the impact of public procurement initiatives has been equally 
elusive. Our database for purchases of drugs and medical devices in Chile between 2001 and 2006 spans the year in 
which the procurement portal was introduced, and includes other variables that may have affected prices.  This 
allows us to quantify savings and identify the sources of these savings. 
The next section discusses aggregation of purchases and use of procurement platforms in the health sector. The third 
section presents our data and models, the fourth discusses our results, and the fifth offers some concluding remarks.  
Aggregation and the use of procurement portals in the health sector 
Procurement in the health sector is sensitive because the cost of health care has been rising rapidly, and it is 
challenging because there are often only a few suppliers.  Initiatives to aggregate purchases to counteract supplier 
power have been attempted in several countries, coinciding in some cases with the introduction of procurement 
platforms. 
In the United States Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) have aggregated the demand of several hundred 
hospitals in order to negotiate better prices. Managed care organizations, including health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), provide healthcare to patients through a network of providers. These organizations use their purchase 
volume and, in the case of drugs, restrictive formularies, in order to obtain better prices. In other countries the 
government, as the largest provider of healthcare, can leverage its volume and use restrictive lists in order to gain 
price concessions. In Chile the government accounts for 47% of health spending and 20% of spending on drugs2.   
Cenabast was created in the late 1970s to purchase, manage inventories and distribute drugs and medical supplies 
for the public hospitals of Chile and other health programs of the Ministry of Health.  As compensation for these 
services, it received a commission of 6%.  By holding centralized inventories, Cenabast reduced inventory holding 
costs for hospitals, an added advantage to the lower unit prices and transactions costs discussed above. The use of 
Cenabast was not obligatory for hospitals. 
Both Cenabast in Chile and the GPOs and HMOs in the US aggregate purchases, but the governmental character of 
Cenabast subjects it to public procurement guidelines. Tenders are obligatory, they must have a minimum number of 
bidders, and they have to be widely publicized. Bidders must have a minimum number of days after the tender is 
posted to prepare their bids. These guidelines, which have tended to converge internationally as a result of 
UNCITRAL, are meant to control corruption by public officials. 
In the United States separate electronic platforms were introduced by several networks of buying hospitals on the 
one hand and by suppliers on the other.  Consolidation of these platforms was only achieved when participants 
                                                          
2 World Health Organization Database. As the government relies heavily on generic drugs, its share of the volume is much larger. 
Chile’s reliance on generics is unusual. Generics represent 70% of the value of outpatient sales and over 90% of the volume. The 
respective figures for the US are 19.4% and 71.3%. Comparison of the age of drugs used on an outpatient basis is also interesting. 
Chile’s consumption of drugs aged less than 5 years is only 8% of the US level, whereas its consumption of drugs aged between 
21 and 30 years is 36% of the US level. Danzon and Furukawa (2008). 
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agreed that no commercial arrangements would change as a result (Applegate and Ladge 2003). In Chile, Cenabast 
established a platform to connect it with participating hospitals and suppliers.  
In 1999 the government established Chilecompra, an electronic platform for all its purchases, but which in practice 
served mainly as an outlet to publicize transactions after they happened. In 2004, new legislation made it 
compulsory for all agencies, including Cenabast and all municipalities, to use Chilecompra for procurement. On the 
new platform buyers from different government bodies could carry out the whole procurement process from posting 
requirements to publicizing outcomes, following standardized guidelines.  Starting in 2005, firms wanting to supply 
the government had no alternative other than to participate in Chilecompra. To facilitate the process, programs were 
introduced to train buyers in public agencies and ministries and suppliers, especially small and medium enterprises 
(SME). 
This left the hospitals with a choice between using Chilecompra directly or through Cenabast. Since the number of 
public hospitals using the services of Cenabast increased from almost 100 in 2002 to 190 in 2006, it appears that 
Cenabast was perceived as a good option. In 2006 Cenabast represented 50% of the purchases of public hospitals, up 
from 20% in 2002. 
Chilecompra can have several economic effects. First, bidders and buyers are less likely to engage in corrupt 
practices, like changing bids or other conditions after the close of a tender, if they believe that an electronic trail of 
these actions can be scrutinized by the authorities.  As the identity of bidders that participate in each tender and the 
bid of the winner are publicized on the Internet the process can also be monitored by competitors and citizen groups. 
Second, bidders may be less likely to collude as they fear detection3. Since the platform does not publicize the bids 
made by each bidder, it does not promote collusion by making deviations from agreements easier to detect and 
punish4. Third, Chilecompra can lead to greater transaction efficiency. We will refer to the combined effect of less 
corruption and collusion and greater transaction efficiency as the “platform effect”. Fourth, Chilecompra could 
attract more bidders, including small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
The operation of Cenabast and Chilecompra raises two empirical questions with policy relevance beyond this 
particular case. First, do group purchasing initiatives result in lower prices and if so, is this a result of a higher 
volume and/or the use of restricted formularies? Second, do electronic procurement platforms result in lower prices 
and, if so, is it because of a “network efficiency effect” or because more suppliers are attracted? 
The first question has been addressed by Ellison and Snyder (2001) in a paper where they compare the prices paid 
by hospitals, HMOs and drugstores in the United States.  They found that hospitals paid 35% less than drugstores for 
branded off patent drugs and 10% less for on patent drugs. They interpret this as evidence that discounts result 
mainly from restrictive formularies.  Hospitals have greater relative substitution possibilities for branded off patent 
drugs than for drugs still on patent. Moore and Newman (1993) found that states using restricted formularies spent 
14.8% less per person on pharmaceuticals in their Medicaid programs5. To get a sense of the importance of volume, 
Ellison and Snyder (2001) compared the prices paid by drugstore chains and independent drugstores but they were 
not able to isolate the volume effect econometrically because they lacked volume data. Wu (2009) established that 
both the volume and the substitution possibilities of buyers affect the prices paid at hospitals. 
Regarding the second question, the World Bank has reported savings in the cost of goods purchased of 2.5% in 
Ireland and of 5.0% in Canada, and the Office of Government Purchases of the United Kingdom reports savings of 
7.5% from electronic purchasing6. Although the methodology used in these studies is unclear, these figures have 
                                                          
3 This fear of detection may affect behavior even when collusion cannot normally be inferred from only the bids.  As discussed in 
Bajari and Summers (2002), if bid functions could be estimated using variables that affect the costs of different bidders, the 
correlation of residuals between groups of bidders would be evidence of collusion, as would bidders reacting differently to 
objective cost conditions. They refer to these as the failure of independence and exchangeability.  
 
4 Stigler (1964) warned about this danger a long time ago. 
 
5 They control for other variables that may affect spending like income per capita and percent of the population covered by 
Medicaid that is older than 65. 
 
6 Idea Knowledge, the UK government’s consultants, did not venture to calculate the price saving in tenders.  
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been used to  promote the use of electronic platforms by governments. We are not aware of any econometric work 
that measures the price impact of procurement portals.   
This paper finds that Chilecompra saved the government money in the purchase of drugs and medical devices. It 
also finds that this was not a consequence of attracting a larger number of bidders, SME or otherwise. This contrasts 
with conventional wisdom and governmental reports that justified the investment in the platform by showing that 
each tender in 2005 had 5.7 bidders on average, almost twice the minimum number required by law, and 
substantially more than before the initiative was implemented.  We found that the government overstated the number 
of bidders per auction, and that in reality this number had not increased after the implementation of Chilecompra.  
Examination of 115 tenders posted on their website showed that these tenders were for groups of items for each of 
which a winner was determined independently. What they called a tender was in fact a set of auctions which were 
closed simultaneously and which were grouped for administrative reasons7. When we considered these individual 
auctions, we found that there were in fact only 2.5 bids per auction on average. With 2.26 auctions per tender on 
average, we find the origin of the misleading indicator of 5.7 bids.  In fact, the average number of bidders per 
auction for Cenabast declined from 2.6 before Chilecompra was implemented to 2.3 after 2004. It is understandable 
that the government would recur to this common justification of the saving, but the data does not bear them out.  
Data & Models 
Cenabast provided us with detailed information on the 6,888 auctions for drugs and medical devices that they 
conducted between 2001 and 2006 on behalf of the public hospitals of Chile. For each auction we had the name of 
the drug or medical device, the presentation, the identification number of each bidder participating, the bid of each 
bidder, the winning bid and whether the item was imported or domestically produced.  Auctions conducted through 
the end of 2004 were implemented by Cenabast in the traditional way, and thereafter through Chilecompra. During 
this period Cenabast procured a total of $350 million. Most drugs (97.5%) were off patent and were purchased by 
their generic name. Most medical devices were imported. 
Cenabast classified drugs into 556 codes according to their active pharmaceutical ingredient (API or generic name), 
dosage and presentation. These drug codes were further classified into 19 groups according to therapeutic use.  
There are 821 codes for medical devices which are classified into 7 groups according to use. The groups are shown 
in Table 1. Both drugs and medical devices come in a number of presentations. We have a total of 1,377 codes, 556 
for drugs and 821 for medical devices. 
 
Table 1. Classes of Drugs and Medical Devices 
 
Drugs 15 Serums, Toxoids and Vaccines
1 Anti-infective Agents 16 Skin and Mucous Membrane Agents
2 Antineoplastic Agents 17 Smooth Muscle Relaxants
3 Autonomic Drugs 18 Vitamins
4 Blood Formation, Coagulation and Thrombosis 19 Miscellaneous Therapeutic Agents
5 Cardiovascular Drugs
6 Central Nervous System Agents Medical Devices
7 Electrolytic, Caloric  and Water Balance 1 Intravenous Sets
8 Respiratory Tract Agents 2 Surgical Supplies
9 Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat 3 Syringes
10 Gastrointestinal Drugs 4 Diagnostic Equipment and Supplies
11 Hormones and Synthetic Substitutes 5 Dental Devices and Supplies
12 Local Anesthetics 6 Hallowware
13 Oxytocics 7 Miscellaneous
14 Radioactive Agents  
                                                          
7 A study done on the procurement of cleaning services in Sweden, Lundberg (2005), suggests that such grouping of auctions is 
not peculiar to Chile.  
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We eliminated auctions corresponding to codes which had not been procured before 2005 or had only been 
auctioned once. This left us with 5,244 auctions, 2,122 for drugs and 3,122 for medical devices. On average we had 
112 auctions per drug group and 446 auctions per medical device group. 
We also used volume and price data on the sale of drugs to the three pharmacy chains that control 95% of the private 
market in Chile. This data, which was purchased from IMS Chile, was matched up with the Cenabast data by API. 
Prices and volumes were transformed to match the units of Cenabast codes.  
To isolate the effect of the Chilecompra platform and of volume aggregation on prices we specify two regression 
models. Table 2 explains the variables used. All monetary variables are in Chilean Pesos. The winning bid, 
auctioned volume and exchange rate variables are normalized in order to make the units comparable and to avoid 
heteroskedasticity8.   
Model 1 explains the winning bid in each auction relative to the historic price for the corresponding code. The 
independent variables include the characteristics of the auction (time between auctions and days between the 
announcement of the auction and its close), number of bidders, factors affecting rivalry (CI, one bidder), volume, the 
exchange rate, additional bids and a dummy variable which equals one if the auction is conducted after 
Chilecompra. Model 1 is given by: 
ln (WBit/WBio) =  f [ Daysit, Chilecomprait, ABit, CIit, ln (Qit/Qio), ln (ERit/ERio), OneBidderit, Biddersit                            
      TimeBetweenAuctionsit, Bidders
2
it ],      (1) 
where i are the codes and t the years 2001 through 2006 
The expected sign for each explanatory variable is shown in Table 2 and is explained below. Descriptive statistics 
for the variables are shown in Table 3.  Since the first observation for each code is used to calculate the ratios 
indicated above we are left with 1,566 observations for drugs and 2,301 observations for medical devices. 
Model 2, run only for drugs, explains the winning bid in each auction relative to the concurrent price paid by 
drugstore chains for the corresponding code. Several of the independent variables are the same as in Model 1. In 
addition, Model 2 includes patent status and whether the drug is sold under prescription. Volume is measured 
relative to concurrent drugstore chain volume. Model 2 is given by: 
ln (WBit/P
Ph
it) =  g [ Daysit, Chilecomprait, ABit,  ln (Qit/Q
Ph
it), Patentit, Prescriptionit. Biddersit,  
     Bidders2it ]        (2) 
where i are the codes and t the years 2001 through 2006 
Descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Table 49.  Concurrent private sector transactions were 
unavailable for 895 auctions, so we were left with 1,227 observations. 
We proceed to discuss our hypothesis about the sign of these variables (shown in the last column of Table 2). This is 
based on the predictions of auction theory for private value first price auctions, and on the insights from industrial 
organization theory, I.O., which Klemperer (2005) has found to be valid in a repeated auction setting. 
We start with auction characteristic variables. As the number of days between the announcement of an auction and 
its close increases, the relative price should be lower as bidders have more time to prepare for tenders. It is also less 
likely that a competent bidder is excluded by a corrupt arrangement with the auctioneer, because there is a larger 
window for pre auction appeals. For this reason international guidelines as those of the World Bank (2004) try to 
extend this period. 
In non-auction markets a longer period between transactions makes undercutting more tempting because a firm that 
deviates from an agreed price will encounter a delayed punishment. This makes collusion more difficult and prices 
                                                          
8 Bajari and Ye (2003) divide the bids by engineering estimates. Zhong and Wu (2006) and Mithas and Jones (2007) use the 
winning bid as a percentage of the historical cost. Our approach corresponds to the latter. 
 
9 IMS prices are at the manufacturer level. They exclude wholesale and pharmacy markup and were calculated backwards from 
retail prices using a proprietary model.  Since these prices exclude wholesale markups, it is not surprising that they are so low -
50% on average- in comparison to the prices paid by the government. 
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lower (Tirole, 1988). Similarly, more time between auctions will make it more difficult for suppliers to divide 
contracts or arrange for side payments.  Prices should be lower as the time between auctions lengthens. 
 
Table 2. Description of Variables 
Name Description Sign 
ABit 
If a bidder makes more than one bid in an auction these 
bids are considered additional bids 
? 
Daysit 
Number of days between the announcement of the 
auction and the auction close 
- 
Chilecomprait 
A dummy that takes on a value of one in 2005 or 2006 
when the new Chilecompra platform was in operation 
- 
CIit 
Extent to which the bidders participating in an auction 




Exchange rate at the time the auctions was conducted 
relative to the exchange rate at the time the first auction 





Volume auctioned relative to the volume purchased by 
drugstore chains  
- 
ln (Qit/Qio) 
Volume auctioned relative to the volume in the first 
auction for the same code 
- 
ln (WBit/WBio) 
Winning bid relative to the winning bid in the first 









Dummy variable that equals one if there is a single bidder 
or if all bidders have bid before for the same code 
+ 
Patentit 




Dummy variable that is equal to one if drugstores sell the 
drug under prescription 
- 
Bidders2 it 




Number of years between two consecutive auctions for 
the same code 
- 
Biddersit Number of bidders participating in an auction - 
 DV1 and DV2 are the dependent variables for Models 1 and 2. 
 
In most IO settings, based on cooperative or non-cooperative games, prices fall with the number of rivals. In auction 
theory this is true for independent private values (Laffont, 1997). As the number of bidders increases, each one will 
bid closer to its cost. The winning bid will be lower because of this aggressiveness and because the expected cost of 
the winning bidders is lower.  If the winning bid were to increase with the number of bidders, this would contradict 
Economics and Information Systems 
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the private values model. To allow for the possible non-linear effect of the number of bidders we also include the 
square of the number of bidders10.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for Model 1  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Daysit 9.57 1.57 3 10 9.34 1.89 3 10 9.92 0.74 3 10
Chilecomprait 0.40 0.49 0 1
ABit 0.52 1.08 0 12 0.65 1.24 0 12 0.33 0.74 0 5
CIit 0.11 0.12 0 1 0.10 0.12 0 1 0.12 0.13 0 1
ln (Qit/Qio) 0.39 1.59 -7.35 8.44 0.11 1.48 -7.35 5.73 0.83 1.64 -5.21 8.44
ln (ERit/ERio) -0.05 0.10 -0.32 0.23 0.02 0.08 -0.24 0.23 -0.14 0.06 -0.32 0.04
OneBidderit 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.61 0.49 0 1
Bidders
2
 it 8.34 9.64 1 81 9.16 10.47 1 81 7.08 8.04 1 64
TimeBetweenAuctionsit 0.88 1.00 0 5.45 0.77 1.02 0 3.68 1.05 0.94 0 5.45
Biddersit 2.51 1.42 1 9 2.64 1.48 1 9 2.32 1.30 1 8
ln (WBit/WBio) -0.03 0.37 -3.19 2.92 0.03 0.30 -3.19 1.75 -0.12 0.43 -2.72 2.92
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Daysit 9.66 1.45 3 10 9.48 1.77 3 10 9.93 0.68 3 10
Chilecomprait 0.40 0.49 0 1
ABit 0.27 0.83 0 12 0.25 0.95 0 12 0.30 0.61 0 5
CIit 0.13 0.12 0 1 0.13 0.13 0 1 0.12 0.11 0 1
ln (Qit/Qio) 0.47 1.75 -6.91 8.44 0.15 1.66 -6.91 5.73 0.95 1.77 -5.13 8.44
ln (ERit/ERio) -0.06 0.10 -0.32 0.22 0.00 0.07 -0.24 0.22 -0.15 0.07 -0.32 0.04
OneBidderit 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.75 0.43 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1
Bidders
2
 it 6.14 6.83 1 49 6.13 6.65 1 49 6.15 7.10 1 49
TimeBetweenAuctionsit 0.96 1.01 0 5.45 0.87 1.03 0 3.52 1.09 0.97 0 5.45
Biddersit 2.19 1.17 1 7 2.19 1.15 1 7 2.17 1.20 1 7
ln (WBit/WBio) -0.06 0.34 -3.19 1.23 0.01 0.30 -3.19 1.23 -0.15 0.38 -2.04 1.21
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Daysit 9.50 1.64 3 10 9.24 1.96 3 10 9.91 0.79 3 10
Chilecomprait 0.39 0.49 0 1
ABit 0.69 1.19 0 6 0.91 1.33 0 6 0.36 0.82 0 4
CIit 0.09 0.12 0 1 0.08 0.11 0 1 0.11 0.14 0 1
ln (Qit/Qio) 0.34 1.46 -7.35 5.67 0.09 1.35 -7.35 5.16 0.75 1.54 -5.21 5.67
ln (ERit/ERio) -0.04 0.11 -0.32 0.23 0.03 0.08 -0.21 0.23 -0.13 0.06 -0.32 0.02
OneBidderit 0.68 0.47 0 1 0.73 0.44 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1
Bidders
2
 it 9.84 10.90 1 81 11.19 11.97 1 81 7.74 8.58 1 64
TimeBetweenAuctionsit 0.83 0.99 0 4.96 0.70 1.00 0 3.68 1.02 0.93 0 4.96
Biddersit 2.74 1.53 1 9 2.94 1.60 1 9 2.43 1.36 1 8
ln (WBit/WBio) -0.01 0.38 -2.72 2.92 0.05 0.30 -1.29 1.75 -0.11 0.47 -2.72 2.92
Variable
Medical devices (n=2301) Before Chilecompra (n=1403) After Chilecompra (n=898)
Variable
Drugs (n=1566) Before Chilecompra (n=936) After Chilecompra (n=630)




CI and OneBidder are designed to pick up rivalry in Model 1. The CI variable tries to capture the effect on bidders 
of contact across multiple markets. The “multi-market contact” story in I.O. says that when bidders meet in more 
than one market, they are more likely to collaborate, as they will hold their punches in a market where they are 
strong to avoid punishment in markets where they are weak (Bernheim and Whinston 1990). In non-auction 
markets, collaboration means splitting the market in ways that maximize carter stability, which may mean not 
participating in one of the markets when costs are asymmetric. In auction markets, when side payments are not 
possible, collaboration may be sustained by dividing contracts. 
                                                          
10 Lundberg (2005) uses the same variables as we do in winning bid regressions. Ingraham (2005) also uses them to explain the 
distance between the winning bid and the best loosing bid. Other ways of capturing non linearity in the effect of the number of 
bidders have also been used. Gupta (2002) enters the number of bidders in a piecewise linear manner. Brannman et al. (1987) and 
MacDonald et al. (2002) enter dummies for different numbers of bidders. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for Model 2 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Daysit 9.65 1.43 3 10 9.57 1.58 3 10 9.91 0.79 3 10
Chilecomprait 0.25 0.44 0 1
ABit 0.41 1.33 0 12 0.42 1.49 0 12 0.38 0.65 0 4
ln (Qit/Q
Ph
it) 1.97 2.50 -5.93 10.54 1.65 2.45 -5.93 10.00 2.89 2.40 -3.20 10.54
Patentit 0.03 0.16 0 1 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1
Prescriptionit 0.86 0.35 0 1 0.86 0.35 0 1 0.87 0.34 0 1
Bidders
2
 it 7.11 7.72 1 64 6.95 7.61 1 64 7.60 8.02 1 49
Biddersit 2.36 1.24 1 8 2.34 1.22 1 8 2.44 1.28 1 7
ln (WBit/P
Ph
it) -0.73 0.73 -4.82 1.70 -0.69 0.76 -4.82 1.70 -0.88 0.63 -3.18 0.63
Variable
Full Sample (n=1227) Before Chilecompra (n=915) After Chilecompra (n=312)
 
 
When the bidders that participate in the auction are bidders that in other auctions tend to encounter different rivals 
CI will be large. CI, in a loose sense, picks up the absence of multimarket contact. More precisely, CI for bidder i is 
defined as the ratio of the number of distinct bidders, other than i, that bid in the same auctions as bidder i and the 
total bids made by bidders, other than i, in these same auctions. This index will be large when the bidder participates 
in auctions where the bids come from different bidders and small when it participates in auctions with the same 
bidders11.  The CI index for the auction is large when the bidders participating have high individual CIs. We expect 
the coefficient of this variable to be negative. 
OneBidder is a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is only one bidder or if all bidders participating in the 
auction have coincided in a previous auction for the same product. A single bidder could bid the buyer’s reservation 
price, as could a group of bidders that have so agreed, after competing in previous auctions. When this condition 
exists, the price would tend to be higher12. 
Model 2, which is run only for drugs, includes two additional variables: prescription and patent. Pharmacies filling 
prescriptions in Chile are not able to substitute the branded drug for a generic if the prescription specifies the brand 
name13. For this reason drugstore chains are unable to negotiate price concessions in exchange for higher volumes. 
In contrast, the government awards its full volume for a code to the bidder with the best offer, which is the lowest 
bid when quality differences are not significant. This is why the relative price paid by the government should be 
lower for prescription drugs and we expect the prescription dummy to have a negative coefficient. Model 2 also 
includes the patent status of the drug, a variable which Ellison and Snyder (2001) found to be associated with much 
smaller discounts.  
In non-auction markets, buyers often receive volume discounts. Sellers may incur lower costs when filling a larger 
order, or they may be willing to reduce their margin to steal orders from their rivals. In the Snyder (1996) model the 
regular arrival of large buyers requires lower prices in order to sustain collusion.   
                                                          
11 CI was developed by Feinstein et al. (1985) and has been used by Gupta (2002) and Lundberg (2005). 
 
12 Similar variables have been used by Pesendorfer (2000) and Lee (1999). For Pesendorfer (2000) one bidder takes on a value of 
one if there are only cartel members or if there is only a single non cartel member.  For Lee (1999) one bidder takes on a value of 
one if there is only one bidder, and it results in positive coefficient in his BID regressions. Our variable is closer to that used by 
Lee (1999) as we do not have any evidence of cartels. 
 
13 According to Hellerstein (1998), this is the way it worked in the United States before the anti-substitution laws were repealed 
in all states by 1989. Today, substitution is mandated in some states and is left up to the pharmacy in others. In either case, the 
physician’s prescription can still override these regulations, but an additional action is required. In the two line method the 
physician must sign the “brand medically necessary” line, whereas in the one line method the physician needs to add the text 
“brand medically necessary”. Although 70% of prescriptions were for multisource drugs (i.e. drugs for which generics and a 
trade name were available) in 1989, fewer than 30% specified the generic version. Physician override occurred in 41% of the two 
line prescriptions, but only in 11% of the one line method Hellerstein (1998). 
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A higher exchange rate should increase the price paid by Cenabast, because both drugs and medical devices are 
tradeable.  Most of the drugs are generics produced by local laboratories using imported inputs. As the peso cost of 
these inputs increases with a depreciation of the currency, laboratories will tend to place higher bids, and the 
winning bid should be higher.  Since medical devices are mostly imported, we would expect the pass-through from 
the exchange rate to the local price to be higher than for drugs. 
We were surprised to find more than one bid per bidder in close to 30% of the auctions. If a bidder submits more 
than one bid, the difference is added to a variable called Additional Bids (ABit). Such bids were mostly found for 
medical devices, and their effect on price is not clear.  
The auctions for drugs and medical devices are all scoring auctions, in which the winner is the bidder that offers the 
best combination of price and non-price attributes. Bidders know the weight of price and non-price attributes, but do 
not know the precise way in which non-price points are assigned. They presumably reflect a rating of previous 
supplier performance, but may also include credit for improved product characteristics14.  
One could interpret the phenomenon of multiple bids in at least two different ways. First, the bidder is trying to offer 
different price quality pairs in an auction with an unknown scoring function. In this case, multiple bids might allow 
the buyer to get better value, though not necessarily a lower price. Second, additional bids may help sustain a 
corrupt scheme when a simple substitution of bids is not feasible15. Additional bids shorten the distance between the 
price of the preferred bidder that sends them and its rivals, allowing the auctioneer to grant it the contract with a 
smaller, and therefore more credible, manipulation of quality16. In this case the additional bids are more likely to 
increase price. 
Estimation and Results 
Our data represents an unbalanced panel with observations on 1,377 codes over the six years from 2001 to 2006. We 
first estimated a linear implementation of Model 1 using OLS with the full sample (drugs and medical devices), to 
get a sense of how well our model fits. We used the panel robust standard errors proposed by Arellano (1987) to 
compute t ratios. Table 5 shows the results incrementally adding in the CI, OneBidder and exchange rate variables. 
In the first column, most coefficients take on the expected sign.  Price falls when bidders are given more advance 
notice, when the auction is conducted over Chilecompra, when a higher volume is auctioned and more bidders 
participate.  
When the two rivalry variables, CI and OneBidder, are added in columns 2 and 3, they are significant and have the 
correct sign. In the process, the size of the Chilecompra effect is little changed, remaining close to 14%, which is 
quite large. Since it is measured by a dummy, it could be picking other changes that occurred in 2005-2006 that 
affected prices. Careful consideration of possible variables led us to the exchange rate and to changes in government 
coverage.   
If there is any pass-through from the exchange rate to domestic prices, an appreciating exchange rate should lead to 
lower prices. The exchange rate appreciated from 691.4 Chilean Pesos per US Dollar in 2003 to 530.3 in 2006. 
When the relative exchange rate is included in column 4, the coefficient on Chilecompra drops by 35%. 
AUGE, the program of drugs that are covered by the government for all Chileans, was expanded in 2005. The 
increased volume for certain codes that occurred as a result of this would be picked up by our volume variable, and 
should not inflate our estimated coefficient for Chilecompra. Furthermore, even in 2005, the AUGE program 
represented less than 10% of our observations.  
 
                                                          
14 The originator laboratory could in principle include bids for both the original drug and its generic. Cenabast did not keep a 
record of the scores for non-price attributes. 
 
15 Ingram (2004) derives the pattern of bids that would be consistent with such a substitution. 
 
16 Compte and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2005) and Burguet and Che (2004) develop models along these lines. 
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Table 5. Model 1 (full sample). Pooled OLS estimation. 
Variable Estimate t Arellano Estimate t Arellano Estimate t Arellano Estimate t Arellano
(Intercept) 0.27649 8.302 0.30647 8.119 0.19737 4.414 0.18868 4.239 ***
Daysit -0.00470 -1.428 -0.00548 -1.677 -0.00518 -1.586 -0.00532 -1.705 *
Chilecomprait -0.14079 -9.546 -0.13993 -9.439 -0.13187 -8.969 -0.08582 -3.916 ***
ABit -0.00813 -0.946 -0.00938 -1.098 -0.01345 -1.566 -0.01471 -2.139 **
ln (Qit/Qio) -0.04300 -7.177 -0.04236 -7.161 -0.04258 -7.210 -0.04042 -6.831 ***
CIit -0.12526 -2.018 -0.10710 -1.737 -0.10784 -1.769 *
OneBidderit 0.07014 4.843 0.07126 4.953 ***
ln (ERit/ERio) 0.31686 2.610 **
Bidders
2
 it 0.01388 5.350 0.01446 5.415 0.01187 4.406 0.01176 4.283 ***
TimeBetweenAuctionsit 0.01333 2.337 0.01350 2.364 0.02212 3.679 0.02781 4.367 ***
Biddersit -0.12361 -6.882 -0.12921 -6.853 -0.10182 -5.184 -0.10126 -5.084 ***
F
*** p<0.01  ** p<0.05   * p<0.10









              
In the regressions reported in Table 5 we used the full sample of drugs and medical devices, which are very 
heterogeneous.  For Model 1, we therefore proceeded to separate drugs and medical devices and, for each, allowed 
for the possibility of group effects in the following manner: 
ln (WBit/WBio) =    βo + β1 Daysit + β2 Chilecomprait + β3 ABit +   β4 CIit                                                                                                     
   + β5 ln (Qit/Qio) + β6 ln (ERit/ERio) +β7 OneBidderit +  β8 Biddersit                            
   + β9 TimeBetweenAauctionsit + β10 Bidders
2
it + cg + εit   (3) 
where εit is the error and cg is a group effect, following the classification of Table 1.   
In both cases the hypothesis of random effects is rejected in favor of fixed effects using a Hausman test as explained 
in Greene (2007).  The fixed effect model was estimated using the within estimator, where variables are taken as a 
difference from their group mean. An F test showed that the group effects were significant for both drugs and 
medical devices. The results are show in Tables 6 and 7.  
For Model 2 we also allowed for the existence of group effects: 
ln (WBit/P
Ph
it) =  βo + β1 Daysit + β2 Chilecomprait +  β3 ABit + + β4 ln (Qit/Q
Ph
it)  
+ β5 Patentit + β6 Prescriptionit + β7 Biddersit 
+ β8 Bidders
2
it + cg + εit       (4) 
where εit is the error and cg is a group effect, following the classification of Table 1.   
The Hausman test was unable to reject random effects compared to fixed effects. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test, as explained in Greene (2007), shows that random effects are significant. The random effect model 
was estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). The results are shown in Table 8. In what follows 
the coefficients in these regressions will be discussed and interpreted. 
We begin with our auction characteristic variables: auction days and time between auctions. The coefficient for 
auction days is significant only for drugs.  Each additional day lowers price by 0.89%, but the standard deviation of 
auction days is only 1.45. In Table 8 we find that each additional day lowers the price obtained by Cenabast relative 
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Table 6. Model 1. Drugs. Fixed effects. 
Variable Estimate Std. Error Robust S. E. t Arellano
Daysit -0.00889 0.0059 0.0047 -1.880 *
Chilecomprait -0.08250 0.0236 0.0383 -2.153 **
ABit 0.00311 0.0099 0.0043 0.718
CIit -0.13034 0.0732 0.0783 -1.664 *
ln (Qit/Qio) -0.03479 0.0048 0.0050 -7.015 ***
ln (ERit/ERio) 0.26863 0.1199 0.2357 1.140
OneBidderit 0.01638 0.0212 0.0155 1.059
Bidders
2
 it 0.01106 0.0043 0.0050 2.205 **
TimeBetweenAuctionsit 0.00915 0.0084 0.0093 0.978
Biddersit -0.12574 0.0265 0.0305 -4.118 ***
0.1613 *** p<0.01  ** p<0.05   * p<0.10
F 29.54
F test for group effects
F = 2.6938, df1 = 18, df2 = 1537, p-value = 0.0001512
Hausman Test
chisq = 37.1758, df = 10, p-value = 5.276e-05





Table 7. Model 1. Medical devices. Fixed Effects. 
Variable Estimate Std. Error Robust S. E. t Arellano
Daysit -0.00037 0.0048 0.0078 -0.047
Chilecomprait -0.09141 0.0235 0.0501 -1.825 *
ABit -0.03387 0.0078 0.0142 -2.385 **
CIit -0.10184 0.0676 0.1342 -0.759
ln (Qit/Qio) -0.04304 0.0052 0.0092 -4.702 ***
ln (ERit/ERio) 0.38114 0.1114 0.2106 1.810 *
OneBidderit 0.10706 0.0190 0.0435 2.463 **
Bidders
2
 it 0.00721 0.0026 0.0023 3.196 ***
TimeBetweenAuctionsit 0.04549 0.0085 0.0070 6.472 ***
Biddersit -0.05421 0.0195 0.0111 -4.865 ***
0.1196 *** p<0.01  ** p<0.05   * p<0.10
F 31.01
F test for group effects
F = 19.6341, df1 = 6, df2 = 2284, p-value < 2.2e-16
Hausman Test
chisq = 832.6191, df = 10, p-value < 2.2e-16






The coefficient for time between auctions is only significant for Model 1 and medical devices but has the wrong 
sign.  As the time between auctions increases, the relative price actually increases.  
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More bidders are associated with lower prices. The coefficient in Model 1 is highly significant for both drugs and 
medical devices, with the former being higher in absolute value. The coefficient for Model 2 is also significant and 
has the correct sign, but is much larger. We discussed above how the Chilean authorities were convinced that 
savings from the marketplace were a result of a higher number of bidders. Although we do find that a larger number 
of bidders lead to lower prices, after the platform was introduced the number of bidders remained more or less 
constant for drugs and actually declined for medical devices.  
The variables related to rivalry have the expected effect on price. Higher CI (i.e. the absence of multi-market 
contact) leads to lower prices but only for drugs. In contrast, the presence of a single bidder or only repeated bidders 
(OneBidder) is found to significantly increase the price only for medical devices. These last variables were not 
significant in Model 2. 
Table 8. Model 2. Drugs. Random Effects 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Error Robust S. E. t Arellano
(Intercept) 0.21525 0.1753 0.3319 0.648
Daysit -0.04045 0.0138 0.0228 -1.774 *
Chilecomprait -0.10198 0.0450 0.0580 -1.757 **
ABit 0.00977 0.0149 0.0133 0.734
ln (Qit/Q
Ph
it) -0.05016 0.0082 0.0140 -3.581 ***
Patentit -0.26765 0.1339 0.2042 -1.311
Prescriptionit -0.13682 0.0658 0.0780 -1.754 *
Bidders
2
 it 0.01672 0.0089 0.0077 2.158 **
Biddersit -0.22465 0.0561 0.0622 -3.609 **
0.1249 *** p<0.01  ** p<0.05   * p<0.10
F 21.73
Lagrange Multiplier Test - (Breusch-Pagan)
chisq = 2883654, df = 1, p-value < 2.2e-16
Hausman Test
chisq = 4.3943, df = 8, p-value = 0.8199





Model 2 considers two additional variables: prescription and patent. The coefficient for prescription is negative and 
fairly large in Table 8. In so far as the government can threaten to substitute one prescription drug for another in its 
formulary, it can obtain better prices than the drugstore chains. This is consistent with Ellison and Snyder (2001). 
The patent status of drugs was not significant. 
The volume variable has the correct sign and is highly significant using Model 1. The size of the impact is similar 
for drugs and medical devices, and interestingly, it is also similar for Model 2.  Unlike Elliot and Snyder (2001) we 
are able to measure a volume effect independent of the restricted formulary effect.  
The exchange rate coefficient has the correct sign, but is significant only for medical devices. An appreciation of the 
exchange rate leads to a reduction in price.  
The coefficient for number of additional bids is significant for medical devices, but not for drugs. For medical 
devices we find additional bids lower the price, which does not contradict our first interpretation, based on 
efficiently matching quality price combinations, but is inconsistent with the second, related to corruption. 
Finally, we are left with the Chilecompra or platform effect. For Model 1 the coefficient of Chilecompra is 
significant for both drugs (-0.083) and medical devices (-0.091) and has the correct sign. For Model 2 the 
Chilecompra coefficient (-0.102) is highly significant. The fact that the coefficients are not that different also 
suggests that this is a general platform effect. 
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This platform effect measures the direct effect of the procurement platform.  In addition, Chilecompra reduced 
prices indirectly through several channels. First, by improving the rules, in particular, lengthening the time given to 
bidders to prepare their bids. Second, by bringing in new bidders, even when the average number of bidders per 
auction remained constant or declined. Third, by encouraging greater volume through Cenabast.   
Using the estimated coefficients, together with the change in the mean level of the independent variable after the 
implementation of Chilecompra (Tables 3 and 4), the overall savings of Chilecompra can be decomposed as in Table 
9. The existence of better rules allows for saving of 0.4% to 1.4%. Bringing in new bidders, as measured by the 
reduction in the auctions in which there is a single bidder or in which all bidders coincided in a previous auction for 
the same code, represents a saving of 1.4% for medical devices. The aggregation effect leads to saving of an 
additional 2.8% to 5.6%. The platform effect is responsible for savings of 8.3% to 10.2%.   
Table 9. Total effects of Chilecompra 
Model 2
Drugs Medical Devices Drugs
Better rules 0.4% 1.4%
New bidders 1.4%
Aggregation 2.8% 2.8% 5.6%
Platform effect 8.3% 9.1% 10.2%





Cenabast was not disintermediated with the introduction of Chilecompra. When hospitals were forced to buy 
through Chilecompra with the new rules, they chose to channel these purchases through Cenabast, in order to obtain 
volume discounts.  Between 2002 and 2006 the percentage of purchases done through Cenabast increased from 20% 
to 50%. 
In the case of drugs and medical devices we do not find evidence that the electronic platform attracts a greater 
number of bidders.  Although this is one of the main channels through which platforms are thought to affect prices, 
the evidence does not bear it out.  A greater number of bidders do lower prices, as long established in auction theory, 
but Chilecompra did not attract more bidders. 
For drugs we do find evidence that restricted formularies and aggregation of purchases allow the government to 
obtain better prices, a result which sits comfortably with the mounting evidence in Health Economics (Sorensen 
2003; Wu 2009). 
Conclusion 
Many governments have implemented procurement platforms to signal their openness to scrutiny and, therefore, 
their honesty.  This paper presents the first econometric evidence that such initiatives can result in significant 
savings. Moreover, the implied return on investment is enormous. Savings of 8.3% on the $350 million purchased 
by Cenabast over these years, represents $29 million, which is twice the investment made by Chilecompra in 
launching the platform for the whole public sector. Overall public spending in Chile amounts to $13.3 billion, of 
which $1.9 billion are now channeled over Chilecompra.  
Lack of data has made empirical research on procurement difficult. By using data for a period that spans the 
introduction of Chilecompra and by controlling for other variables that affect prices, we were able to isolate the 
impact of IT investment. Further work with similar data sets can allow researchers to determine the extent to which 
our results extend to corporate procurement platforms and to other industries.    
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